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The purpose of this study is to explore the ways in 
which the smart cities agenda has forced the 
electricity company to reorient its accounting tools. 
It answers the research question: how smart 
electricity costs and pricing policies imposed by 
political decision-makers govern a smart city 
performance. The question, what is smart city 
governance, and the purposes for which cities 
become smart, such as a smart economy, smart 
mobility, smart environment and smart living, have 
attracted the attention of a multitude of researchers 
in recent years (Broccardo, Culasso, & Mauro, 2019; 
Hollands, 2015). Factors that explain the success and 
failure of smart cities goals and projects, such as 
performance measurement (Argento, Grossi, 
Jääskeläinen, Servalli, & Suomala, 2019; Brorström, 
Argento, Grossi, Thomasson, & Almqvist, 2018), 
public governance (Cowley, Joss, & Dayot, 2018), 
public accountability (Mizrahi & Minchuk, 2019) and 
sustainability (Niemann & Hoppe, 2018), are publicly 
known. Critical case study researches have provided 
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The concept of a smart city has attracted the attention of many 
scholars and policymakers in many countries worldwide. The role 
of accounting as a tool of governance in smart city politics, 
however, has so far been largely overlooked, especially in less 
developed countries (LDCs). This paper sets off to fill this 
research gap and hitherto unexplored linkages between 
accounting and smart cities. Drawing on the concept of 
governmentality, the authors conducted a case study based on 
document analysis, meetings observation, and 42 semi-structured 
interviews at a branch of a hybrid electricity company owned by 
New Cairo City in Egypt, during 2018. Findings show that the case 
company has implemented smart distribution networks of 
electricity in which new management accounting technology 
(enterprise resource planning (ERP) system) is used to trace costs, 
revenues, client complaints and feedback in a timely manner. The 
new network (of infrastructure and technologies) has represented 
timely accounting information as a major political power to 
influence accurate governance decision-making, such as smart 
electricity pricing and control, and to challenge governance 
decisions that are not sound. This paper is one of the first studies 
to explore the socio-political dynamics of accounting in smart city 
governance in the context of LDCs. 
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through which smart city governance might remain 
utopian in practice as a new way of governmentality 
and politics (Engelbert, 2019; Wang, 2017). Although 
the word ‘politics’ is a multifaceted word, it can be 
defined here as a set of activities, projects and 
procedures related to city governance. It involves 
making decisions by which the city government can 
govern the performance of organisations and 
people, i.e., the organised control of the city 
community (Grossi, Meijer, & Sargiacomo, 2020; 
Argento et al., 2019). 
The ongoing debate has emerged on the role 
that accounting information plays in smart city 
governance (Bunders & Varró, 2019). Much of the 
smart city governance research (Kitchin, Coletta, & 
McArdle, 2017; Grossi & Pianezzi, 2017) reveal the 
need to pay further attention to the role of 
accounting information in connecting or 
disconnecting macro-smart governance politics and 
micro-organisational change practices, i.e., policies, 
especially in public services owned by the city 
(Argento et al., 2019; Grossi et al., 2020). Previous 
research has shown that accounting has the 
potential to implement various neoliberal initiatives, 
which explains the proliferation of smart city 
concepts/governance in emerging economies 
(Hopper, 2017; Soobaroyen, Tsamenyi, & Sapra, 
2017; Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008). The 
ways in which accounting has been re-oriented in 
such economic and political contexts shape a central 
issue in problematising the role of accounting in 
smart city governance. 
In this setting, macro-micro accounting 
connections have been explored in emerging 
economies, where economic organisations have been 
largely rebuilt through postcolonial and neocolonial 
politics of nationalisation and various structural 
reforms. Accounting reforms in these organisations, 
as discussed in current LDCs studies, have been 
explained based on exogenous political dynamics 
(Wickramasinghe, Hopper, & Rathnasiri, 2004; Uddin 
& Hopper, 2001; Hoque & Hopper, 1994). These 
seminal studies explained how state politics of 
various structural developments caused inefficiency 
of accounting to produce the ideal-type 
techno-economic and rational-bureaucratic function 
anticipated of it. However, despite their significant 
contributions, these studies focused only on how 
state politics affect organisational accounting 
practices and policies, not on accounting’s 
instrumentality in recognising the city’s 
socio-political ambitions and projects of smart 
governance. Our paper focuses on the latter – the 
role of accounting in smart city governance. We 
argue that cities seeking for smart governance 
participate in urban development projects 
re-orienting organisational practices and policies 
towards desired ambitions and politics, by 
implementing new technologies of government 
management and accounting and collaborating with 
major private sector actors (Grossi et al., 2020; 
Argento et al., 2019; Mizrahi & Minchuk, 2019). 
Our paper uses Foucault’s (2008) 
governmentality approach to explore accounting 
connections between micro-organisational 
developments and macro-ideological changes in 
smart city governance. Drawing on governmentality, 
the emergence of modern management and 
management accounting technologies underpinning 
smart city governance can be the outcomes of new 
ways of thinking and acting, which also enable the 
construction of a new neoliberal mode of governing 
people/society (Hoskin and Macve (2016) and 
Armstrong (2015) conducted seminal studies 
focused on the rise of calculability). Using a case 
study approach, data came from four-month 
intensive fieldwork in the case company’s 
management accounting practices, and an extensive 
review of secondary materials on New Cairo Council 
reforms characterising smart city governance 
politics. Data analysis focused on how accounting 
assumes political meanings when the city 
government (council) has functioned it as a smart 
governance technology, thus embedding the 
aspirations of socio-political transformations 
witnessed in New Cairo in the past few years. 
This paper contributes to smart city 
governance research, especially from an accounting 
perspective in a developing economy setting as in 
Egypt. Theoretical contributions highlight the 
emergence of accounting as a smart governance 
practice in companies owned by public sector 
organisations. Attending to smart city governance 
and striving to reveal the case company’s response 
to the request of the New Cairo Council, through the 
implementation of smart distribution networks 
(hereafter SDNs) and modern management and 
accounting technologies that monitor daily 
distribution cost movements, serve as extraordinary 
contributions to the current literature of smart city 
governance and critical accounting. The paper also 
highlights that it is a political response to the needs 
of governance and power, i.e., management 
accounting has become subject to the politics of the 
‘city’ government, rather than state politics as 
discussed in current LDCs studies.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 provides a literature review. Section 3 
explains the theory and Section 4 is about research 
methods. Section 5 analyses the empirical findings 
and Section 6 discusses the key findings. The paper 
ends with a conclusion in Section 7. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The smart city provides a better empirical space to 
explain accounting connections with neoliberal 
governmentality and politics. While corporations 
and other accounting entities (non-governmental 
organisations and state-owned enterprises) provide 
ordinary empirical spaces for exploring this 
connection, smart cities provide much better 
empirical space for this connection. Because there is 
very little accounting literature on smart cities 
(Argento et al., 2019; Brorström et al., 2018), we 
locate our literature and theory sections primarily 
on neoliberal politics and governmentality literature 
in accounting (Chiapello, 2017; Bigoni & Funnell, 
2015). We bring in smart city literature from other 
fields to provide clarity on the concept of smart city 
and clarify that smart city governance is a new 
neoliberal ideology of thinking and acting that can 
be explained by the governmentality’s analytical 
lenses. 
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2.1. Smart city governance and neoliberalism 
 
Smart city governance could be perceived as 
a neoliberal ideology that goes beyond the 
traditional characteristics and politics of the city. 
Meijer and Bolívar (2016), for example, suggest three 
characteristics of smart governance politics, 
i.e., cities with smart technologies, smart people and 
smart collaborations. Consistent with this, Grossi 
and Pianezzi (2017) claim that the smart city 
paradigm is based on a neoliberal ideology that goes 
beyond integrating technologies, human factors, and 
collaborative networks. Cities become smart by 
implementing the neoliberal urban market 
restructuring and using different governance 
politics, such as competitive tendering, privatisation 
and public-private partnerships (Tomor, Meijer, 
Michels, & Geertman, 2019). 
Smart governance then controls collaboration 
between people and organisations in order to 
implement a specific policy and/or reach a specific 
goal (Tomor et al., 2019). Governance is the work of 
governing, i.e., using power to lead people and 
organisations towards a specific goal. Power is the 
ability to use resources to make people and 
organisations think and act in ways they cannot do 
otherwise (Raco & Imrie, 2000). Organisations 
involved in collaborative (smart) governance are 
often inter-dependent. Governing collaboration, 
therefore, emphasises the ways in which specific 
entities involved in smart governance are 
governmentalised (Argento et al., 2019; Grossi 
et al., 2020). 
Smart governance literature focusses on inter-
organisational leadership and management 
strategies which generate greater competitive 
advantages for the entire collaborative network than 
one organisation can achieve alone (Grossi & 
Pianezzi, 2017; Tomor et al., 2019). The gap in this 
literature, however, is about intra-organisational 
strategies and processes that each organisation 
implements to improve its performance and enhance 
the competitive advantage of other organisations 
that are members of the inter-organisational 
collaborative network (Argento et al., 2019; Kitchin 
et al., 2017). Filling this gap begs for analysing intra- 
and inter-organisational mechanisms of 
governmentality; i.e., “technologies of government” 
that governments use to governmentalise 
collaborations (Foucault, 2008). In a Foucauldian 
sense, in smart governance politics, city 
governments use collaborative networks to ‘govern 
at distance’ (Argento et al., 2019). They use 
programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, 
documents and procedures to implement specific 
neoliberal goals and politics of smart governance 
(Tomor et al., 2019; Raco & Imrie, 2000).  
For this purpose, city governments use 
calculative resources and data to govern their 
networked organisations (Bunders & Varró, 2019). 
Calculative resources, such as costs, budgets and 
resilience mechanisms, play an instrumental 
accounting role in shaping the governance 
structures of smart city networks (Almquist, Grossi, 
van Helden, & Reichard, 2013). The network includes 
different organisations (public, private and 
not-for-profit) that the government uses to achieve 
its socio-political governance goals and politics 
(Tomor et al., 2019). For example, Brorström et al. 
(2018) present a study of how a public-private 
partnership organisation implemented an integrated 
performance management system to improve cost 
competitiveness and organisational profitability. The 
case study of Brorström et al. (2018) goes a bit 
further to show if and how new key performance 
indicators became a calculative tool for other 
organisations operating in the same market to 
influence public accountability policies set by the 
city government. 
 
2.2. Accounting’s rhetoric role in smart governance 
 
Within the neo-liberalisation of smart city 
governance, accounting has so far been perceived as 
being influenced rather than the influencer (Argento 
et al., 2019; Brorström et al., 2018). This perspective 
has examined how the politico-economic and 
cultural conditions surrounding a city’s structural 
adjustments recognise accounting as 
an ‘economically ineffective’ politico-cultural 
ideology rather than calculative processes for 
rationalising operational decisions and controls. 
Such research is polarised and dominated by the 
analytical duality between the politico-cultural 
realities of management accounting within natural 
sites and an ‘ideal-type’ image (Weber, 1968), 
emanated from western experiences of management 
accounting (Skærbæk & Melander, 2004; Ogden, 
1997). Hoque and Hopper (1994), for example, 
explore how the ‘real’ implementation of accounting 
and accountability systems (naturally textbook 
models of resource allocation and hierarchical 
accountability), had been reduced to ritualistic and 
institutionalised positions, with the acquisition of 
exogenous legitimacy being their main objective. 
Such policies, coupled with political interventions, 
provided formal organisational control systems not 
adequate for managers involved in decision-making. 
Smart structural adjustments are thus 
perceived as a specific political episode that 
penetrated cultural-politics in formal management 
accounting and control systems. As a tangible mode 
of post-colonial neoliberalism, privatisation brought 
a peculiar combination of political and managerial 
rationalities, on which management accounting 
researchers concentrated. For example, Uddin and 
Hopper (2001) conducted a case study of 
a privatised manufacturing company in Bangladesh 
and revealed how the political interventions caused 
accounting control issues at the phase of 
production. Taking Burawoy’s (1979, 1985) 
“manufacturing consent” and “politics of 
production” forward, Uddin and Hopper (2001) 
argued that control regimes shifted from colonial to 
market despotism through (smart) structural 
readjustments that permeated state politics in the 
politics of production. The role of management 
accounting here ensures that these politics are 
reinstated and coerced. Consistent with this, the 
case study of a Sri Lankan Telecom company 
conducted by Wickramasinghe et al. (2004) revealed 
that post-colonial privatisation attempts were not 
only for Japanese capital but also for work ethics 
and culture. However, such restructuring attempts 
were limited due to the regulatory pressures 
imposed by the political parties and related trade 
unions. Furthermore, studies in the South Asia 
context, such as those of a Sri Lankan plantation 
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(Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008), and studies in 
the African context, such as those from Ghana, 
Nigeria and South Africa (Soobaroyen et al., 2017), 
also revealed similar political narrative, with further 
analytical involvements of ethnic politics, civil 
society, bureaucratic budgets, individualisation, etc. 
Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of the 
regulatory and control functions of management 
accounting, as considered by the political class, was 
enhanced by extending the political narrative 
beyond South Asia and Africa. For instance, the 
mediation of tensions in managerial accounting 
domains, especially between the local demand for 
public welfare and new public management’s 
profit-driven neoliberal modes, by (smart) structural 
adjustments, was highlighted by Sharma and 
Lawrence (2005) in studying Fiji’s Public Rental 
Board. Also, these tensions were supported from 
a different perspective, in Sharma and Lawrence’s 
(2015) study of Fijian Telecom. Moreover, these 
researchers employed Habermas’s theory of “social 
development” to illustrate how the political elites’ 
achievement of politico-economic benefits, including 
the emergence of varied types of corruption, 
patrimonialism, and crony capitalism, is assisted by 
translating privatisation into a suitable managerial 
and political rhetoric of greater effectiveness, 
efficiency and consumer awareness (Hopper, 2017). 
Despite relying on various theoretical and 
empirical insights, management accounting research 
on smart structural developments within neoliberal 
urban cities promoted the following overarching 
observations: 
1. In typical city development scenarios, and to 
the extent that it is a market-based performance 
reporting system, management accounting was the 
institutional requirement for the effective 
implementation of the neoliberal market logic. The 
World Bank confirmed this by investing in the 
infrastructure development of management 
accounting, including management accounting 
education and standardising management 
accounting practices. With these expectations for 
modernising management accounting routines, 
various ‘informing technologies’ were installed as 
a prerequisite for obtaining loans (Neu, Gomez, 
Graham, & Heincke, 2006). 
2. Nevertheless, rather than bringing broader 
city development results, this restructuring brought 
private accounting and control with a widespread 
deterioration of working conditions and public 
accountability. However, the World Bank hegemony 
on structural developments operated discursively, 
legitimising smart city developments by measuring 
narrow profit-based performance, although the 
accuracy of management accounting information to 
support such claims proved problematic (Jayasinghe 
& Uddin, 2019). 
By describing how the political governance of 
smart and neoliberal cities is engendered by the 
connection between management accounting and 
other higher order political processes and principles, 
this paper extends the insights expressed above. In 
response to global trends towards urbanisation and 
the current lack of accounting studies in smart 
cities, our research explores how changes in 
management accounting are fundamental in 
governmentalising the political city’s changing 
ideologies of urban developments. 
3. THEORY OVERVIEW 
 
This paper adopts a Foucauldian governmentality 
concept to provide a critical alternative approach to 
explain how smart cities reflect power-knowledge 
relations and are featured as new neoliberal politics 
for the (re)production of techno-centric rhetoric 
where urban city developments are governed. 
Neoliberal governmentality is perceived as 
an appropriate analytical tool for exploring 
power-knowledge relations in smart cities (Wang, 
2017). It has been taken up by different 
perspectives, for example, urban policy (Raco & 
Imrie, 2000), the logic of urban control (Kitchin 
et al., 2017), public administration (Rose & Miller, 
2008), and accounting (Argento et al., 2019; 
Brorström et al., 2018). 
These accounting and other researchers 
echoed, and hinted upon, changes on the relations 
of calculative practices and accounting metrics – 
broadly governmentality – and neoliberal modes of 
development. They provided a variety of research 
questions, fieldwork practices and meaningful 
contributions by recognising macro-political 
environments and micro-organisational structures as 
explanatory variables, and by identifying the 
interests served by calculative practices and 
accounting metrics. This expanded scope of critical 
analyses opens up a range of models beyond 
multi-factor regression to social network analysis, 
discourse analysis, and actor-network analysis such 
as neoliberal governmentality analysis (Hoskin & 
Macve, 2016). These analytical expansions revealed 
that calculative practices and accounting metrics are 
positioned in many neoliberal urban development 
projects such as in ‘smart city’ networks, cloud 
computing, social media, electronic commerce, 
artificial intelligence and machine learning, with 
a focus on financial services (Bigoni & Funnell, 
2015). 
However, governmentality has been subject to 
diverse interpretations. Some have broken the 
concept down into ‘govern’ and ‘mentality’, to 
indicate the process by which citizen mentalities 
have been governed through powerful techniques 
that guide them to act in conformity with societal 
norms. These norms are (re)produced, and 
sometimes challenged, by the subjects of this 
system (Raco & Imrie, 2000). Others argue that this 
concept embraces ‘government’ and the suffix ‘ality’, 
in which ‘government/ality’ is not about how to 
govern people’s mentalities, but about the processes 
of (re)constructing specific rationality in order to 
govern specific behaviours (Kitchin et al., 2017). For 
example, as in Section 5, the implementation of 
a smart city governance agenda has resulted in the 
reconstruction of old ‘dispersed’ electricity 
distribution grids into smart ‘integrated’ distribution 
networks. These advanced distribution networks 
were a strategic weapon to reconstruct 
organisational management accounting behaviours 
in the case company. 
Here, governmentality connects the macro level 
of the subjection of the whole population in the 
domain of the smart city (i.e., politics) with the micro 
level of individual subjection (i.e., policies), which 
Foucault studied at earlier work in such governance 
settings as asylums, clinics, and prisons (McKinlay & 
Pezet, 2018; Armstrong, 2015). Governmentality 
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provides a genealogy of disciplinary power at the 
macro and micro levels of smart cities (Kitchin et al., 
2017). Foucault (2008) argues that disciplinary 
power is viewed as a mode of human subjectivity, 
and hence, is related to the emergence and 
development of human and social sciences from the 
16th century onwards. It is seen as an aid to smart 
cities and related political apparatuses in governing 
new electricity distribution networks at distinct, but 
interrelated levels (see Section 5). 
Smart cities are marked the changing neoliberal 
form of government power, public governance and 
accountability, to the extent that Wang (2017) 
considered governmentality to be a guide to the 
genealogy of the ‘modern city’, arguing that this was 
Foucault’s contribution to state theory. However, as 
Rose and Miller (2008) argue, governmentality is not 
a theory of the state or even a theory of power. It is 
more a ‘methodology’ by which it is possible to 
analyse governing a smart city, where political power 
relations, public governance and accountability 
emerge. The smart city is merely a site or 
governance setting for the exercise of these forms of 
neoliberalism. Governmentality offers a means by 
which to understand the dynamics of smart city 
governance at its various levels and forms. As 
explained below, it is more concerned with how 
power is exercised and how it functions: its 
rationales, processes, strategies, and techniques 
(Klauser, Paasche, & Söderström, 2014). 
The smart city governance study of Klauser et 
al. (2014) argues that Foucault’s governmentality 
explains the city government power, and breaks it 
down, in terms of methods and techniques used in 
different governance contexts to act on the 
behaviour of individuals taken separately or in 
a group. It is to shape, direct, modify their way of 
conducting themselves, to enforce their interaction 
ends or fit into overall strategies. These are being 
multiple consequently, in their form and their place 
of exercise; diverse, too, in the procedures and 
techniques they bring into play. Consistent with this, 
the social impact bonds study of Cooper, Graham, & 
Himick (2016) explicated that power-knowledge 
relations characterise the way men govern each 
other; and their analysis shows how, through certain 
forms of government, of madmen, sick people, 
criminals, and so on, the mad, the sick, the 
delinquent subject is objectified. So, an analysis of 
this kind implies not that the abuse of this or that 
power has created madmen, sick people, or 
criminals, there was nothing, but that the various 
and special forms of government of individuals were 
determinant in various objectivation modes for the 
subject. Here, in our case company, these forms and 
modes of governmentality are determinant in the 
New Cairo city council technologies of ERP-based 
distribution management, cost movement reports 
and new pricing structures (see Section 5).  
Governmentality, therefore, challenges 
traditional juridical institutional analyses of 
sovereignty and power, which tend to limit analysis 
to the exercise of governing power through state 
institutions and public laws; instead, 
governmentality provides a more dynamic approach 
to power (Rose & Miller, 2008). It adopts a broader 
neoliberalism conception of government that is not 
limited to the political structure of the smart city 
but extends to the politics/activities that govern 
human behaviour within and without the city’s 
political institutions (Wang, 2017). Drawing on 
Foucault (2008), Wang (2017) argues that smart city 
governance is a mode of action upon others’ actions 
at both individual and collective levels in order to 
achieve objectives within specific institutional 
settings. It is a ‘practice’ of everyday life by various 
kinds of people; it is a mode of power that takes 
many different forms, of which sovereign juridical 
power is just one component. Hence, ‘government’ 
takes multiple and different forms that range from 
governing oneself to governing family or 
interpersonal relations, to the whole society or 
population coming under the political domain of the 
neoliberal smart city (Klauser et al., 2014). According 
to Klauser et al. (2014), these governmentality forms 
of existing neoliberalism are distinct but interrelated 
in smart cities. 
 
4. DATA AND METHODS 
 
4.1. The site and access 
 
The case company works in the field of electricity 
distribution in Egypt and is known here as MEEDCO 
for confidentiality reasons. MEEDCO is a key 
electricity and energy (E&E) distribution company in 
Egypt with 13 branches, 56% market share, 
1.7 billion Egyptian pounds (approx. US$ 10 million) 
annual profit, and 8718 employees (MEEDCO, 2019). 
The government-owned Egyptian Electricity Holding 
Company (EEHC) holds 100% shares of MEEDCO. We 
chose the MEEDCO branch in New Cairo City (subject 
to ownership and supervision by the city 
government) for two reasons. First, it exemplifies the 
transition of New Cairo city from a traditional 
military-dominated governance regime to 
a neoliberal framework that implements a smart city 
approach. Second, MEEDCO offered full access to its 
multifaceted and rich data. Personal connections 
with senior management helped to build trustworthy 
relationships with interviewees and allowed to 
observe managerial meetings as well as accounting 
processes, programs and interactions between 
accounting technologies and users of accounting 
information in organisational decision making. We 
achieved triangulation by using different sources to 
collect data not only to establish validity and 
reliability but also to study the political power of 
accounting for New Cairo’s smart governance in the 
natural situ (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). 
 
4.2. Data collection 
 
We collected data at two different but interrelated 
levels. The first is the macro-political level at which 
city politicians and public officials make and 
implement smart city decisions and policies. The 
second level is the micro organisational level, with 
a focus on restructuring organisational structures 
and processes, i.e., governance and accountability 
technologies, through which MEEDCO’s leadership is 
changing organisational practices to work smartly 
when designing smart distribution networks and 
supplying them to end-users. 
Macro-political data came from archival 
analysis of published materials (reports, periodicals, 
local newspapers, journal articles and websites). 
This, in turn, helped to design a semi-structured 
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interview guide we used for interviews at MEEDCO. 
Micro data came from interviews with different 
organisational actors (accountants, executive 
managers and IT people) and direct observations of 
their daily activities. We used various research 
methods to validate internal data from interviews, 
meeting observations and document analysis. The 
value of using multiple sources ensures an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon involved and 
contributes to a strong embodiment of applied 
theoretical structures (Yin, 2013). In addition, 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe (1991) claim that 
validity is decided by whether the researcher 
obtained full access to the knowledge and feeling of 
the interviewees. The validity, then reliability, relates 
to the amount that the researcher carefully 
describes the peculiarities of the phenomenon aimed 
at the description or theory (McKinnon, 1988). 
Micro-level data collection began on 
June 1, 2018, and ended on September 30, 2018. The 
first author made nine visits to the MEEDCO Head 
Office in New Cairo city and conducted four to five 
interviews during each visit in different operating 
departments. The finance manager accompanied 
him during his first two visits to the company and 
introduced him to other key managers. Overall, 
42 formal interviews were conducted with 
29 different people: sixteen accounting and finance 
managers and personnel, seven operational 
managers, five IT staff and the chief executive 
officer. Interviews were tape-recorded whenever 
possible and all recordings were transcribed. 
Interviews were conducted in Arabic or English as 
per respondents’ preferences. In addition, joint 
meetings were conducted with the finance manager 
and the marketing manager, as well as with the head 
of the cost department, the IT manager and the 
distribution manager. 
MEEDCO provided the first author with an 
office facility next to the finance manager’s office, 
which he used during data collection. This allowed 
more data to be collected from different 
decision-makers and key managers during lunch 
breaks. In addition, he attended eight formal 
managerial meetings as “participant observations” – 
seven at the corporate level, and one departmental 
(Yin, 2013). To ensure confidentiality, meetings were 
not tape-recorded. However, he was allowed to take 
notes during meetings and discuss them with the 
meeting participants afterwards. In a Yinian sense, 
our meeting notes improved our understanding of 
how managers and corporate leaders are deploying 
governance and accountability technologies in New 
Cairo to manage a smart distribution network 
project competitively. 
 
4.3. Data coding 
 
We coded and analysed data manually. A manual 
approach was chosen because language expressions 
can easily refer to different socio-political and 
cultural meanings in the New Cairo context of smart 
governance. As a result, data analysis required 
reading and re-reading the interview transcripts and 
field diary notes while reflecting on secondary 
materials. A software-based coding typically 
removes human elements from analyses (Gioia et al., 
2013). During the first stage, we read the transcripts 
while listening to their audio recordings for 
an overview and to get a ‘feel’ of the data. 
In the second stage, transcripts were re-read 
and coded into specific categories that emerged 
from the interaction between data and theory (cost 
movement reports, new pricing politics, ERP-based 
accounting technologies that triggered city 
electricity changes) and socio-political episodes (data 
on New Cairo’s neoliberal transformations 
accompanied by industrial and technological 
modernisations). Attention focused primarily on 
identifying specific data instances that reveal 1) the 
current city regime of cost and cost management; 
2) the previous regimes and how organisational 
actors make comparisons between them; and 
3) specific city urban developments that triggered 
changes from previous regimes. 
The third stage of coding was theoretical. 
Drawing on governmentality, our analysis was given 
to instances of coded data that reveal 1) accounting 
connections between extra- and intra-organisational 
governing for pricing processes; and 2) urban 
policies to control the cost movements of the New 
Cairo smart electricity project. This consistently 
ensured a combination of literature-based 
interpretations and empirical data during our 
analysis, writing, and rewriting (McKinnon, 1988). 
Throughout our analysis, governmentality was used 
as the most systematic way in which we analysed 
how modern management and management 
accounting technologies have been implicated in 
a specific smart city organisation as new neoliberal 
ways of thinking and acting, and their 
power-knowledge dynamics in governing urban 
collaborations at the extra- and intra-organisational 
levels of the city. This is consistent with the 
governmentality analysis of Brorström et al. (2018) 
as a wider network of actors, organisations and 
systems beyond public-sector organisations and 
public-sector decision-makers. As Almquist et al. 
(2013, p. 479) argue, governmentality can be 
presented as “a concept of structures, rules, 
procedures and mechanisms for the proper steering 
and controlling of corporations” (Argento et al., 




This section is structured into two sub-sections. The 
first addresses how smart electricity delivery 
contributed to install smart governance in New Cairo 
city. The second sub-section deals with the ways in 
which modern management and accounting 
technologies have been implicated in the process of 
setting-up smart city governance. Management 
accounting’s role here involves implementing 
advanced ERP technologies (which serve as 
a managerial and accounting platform for SDNs), 
cost movement reporting and pricing study 
production. 
 
5.1. The emergence of smart governance in New 
Cairo 
 
Smart governance can be perceived as a neoliberal 
way of thinking and acting in New Cairo city. After 
January 25, 2011, socio-political revolution, with the 
old power grid and rapidly growing demand for 
electricity, Egypt needed innovative ways to generate 
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electricity and to manage consumption patterns. 
This created new challenges and opportunities to 
offer smarter ways to manage electricity, from the 
utility, all the way down to the individual 
consumers. The World Bank’s urban reforms went 
through three distinct but interrelated phases of 
electricity reforms – privatisation, modernisation, 
and budgetary reforms. Privatisation aimed at 
selling public sector organisations (or part of them) 
to private investors. Modernisation aimed at 
implementing new policy change reforms in public 
organisations to improve their performance, 
governance and accountability. Budgetary reforms 
governmentalised resilience policies to cut costs of 
public service expenditures. 
These global urban reforms were a starting 
point for transforming various economic sectors and 
related organisations into the logic of smart city 
governance. The implementation of these urban 
reforms in Egypt meant that state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) had to start governmentalising new practices 
that would allow them to operate smart 
economically, technologically and with increasing 
citizen participation. MEEDCO Deputy Director 
explained: 
“These structural reforms of New Cairo city 
became the building blocks of our smart distribution 
networks (SDNs).” 
The Director of the New Cairo City Council 
provided an additional explanation: 
“With the support of New Cairo’s development 
policies, the Ministry of Electricity and Energy 
(MOEE) and related public companies (such as 
MEEDCO) announced their desire to remain at the 
forefront of future smart cities.” 
In response, the Egyptian government decided 
to implement modern managerial and accounting 
reforms in SOEs, rather than privatise them. The City 
Council’s Director added: 
“In March 2012, Prime Minister Sherif Ismail 
announced that the government would stop efforts 
to (re)privatise SOEs that need to be reformed in the 
logic of smart governance instead…” 
The socio-political logic of installing smart 
governance in SOEs is to improve the delivery of 
public services and the welfare of the city’s 
electricity distribution networks. The Deputy 
Director of MEEDCO stated: 
“Prime Minister’s decision to transform SOEs 
into smart governance took place in MEEDCO during 
the same month. The social, political and 
organisational objectives of practising smart city 
governance were to improve the delivery of public 
services and the welfare of the city’s electricity 
distribution networks. More than half of New Cairo’s 
citizens have now access to smart electricity from 
our new distribution networks...” 
Smart electricity delivery helped to establish 
smart governance in New Cairo by installing smart 
distribution networks (SDNs) that are publicly 
recognised as the future infrastructure for safe and 
sustainable electricity. Since early 2013, SDNs have 
become a new way of thinking and acting to 
transform New Cairo electricity into a smart and 
sustainable system of neoliberalism and 
governmentalism. By the end of 2017, SDNs have 
been reconstructed from passive to active 
technologies of government, especially with the 
increasing penetration of SDNs applications such as 
the applications of distributed supply sources (DSS), 
electric vehicles (EVs), advanced 
metering/monitoring infrastructure (AMI) and smart 
appliances (SA). A Senior Manager at MEEDCO states: 
“Compared to the city’s old distribution 
networks, New Cairo smart distribution networks 
(SDNs) is efficient and optimised system wide, highly 
reliable and robust, and capable of effectively 
managing highly penetrated electric vehicles (EVs), 
distributed supply sources (DSS), and other 
controllable loads… Responding to the city council 
demand, in order to govern the city’s SDNs 
implementation, the senior management in MEEDCO 
uses active distribution management practices, 
based on smart distribution applications, hybrid 
control logics and cost minimisation processes.” 
The city council’s socio-political objective of 
the MEEDCO’s SDNs implementation is to act as 
a unique state-owned company in the city’s 
competitive electricity distribution market. The 
Deputy Director said: 
“Although MEEDCO owns about 56% of the 
city’s electricity distribution market, it still faces 
strong competition with other distribution 
companies (public and private). The city council’s 
political aim of the MEEDCO’s SDNs implementation 
is to operate as a unique (state-owned) company 
compared to others. As the largest distribution 
company in the city, MEEDCO buys bulk power 
produced by New Cairo power plants and re-sells 
bulk power to other distribution companies.” 
In response to the smart governance initiative, 
an exclusive contract has been signed with MEEDCO 
to supply 250,000 smart electric metres throughout 
New Cairo. The social and political goal of the city 
council behind that is to install two million smart 
metres over the next five years as part of the city’s 
urban development strategy to eliminate false 
readings, power thefts and distribution costs. In the 
Daily News Egypt (Farag, 2017), the Deputy Director 
commented on MEEDCO’s choice: 
“…MEEDCO was chosen as the only distribution 
company with a unique central governance unit, 
which connects the city’s smart electric metres at 
a distance through reciprocal signals. The MEEDCO’s 
central governance unit is a Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition Unit (SCDAU), which controls the 
flow of electricity distribution across New Cairo city. 
SCDAU is correlated with geographically distributed 
control sub-units in a city. These sub-units gather 
data from different distribution stations, 
transformers, lines and electric metres, and then 
report the data back to SCDAU in no more than four 
seconds through advanced SDNs technologies.” 
Advanced SDNs technologies not only provide 
the MEEDCO’s central governance unit and smart 
electric meters but also cover various other smart 
governance issues. These are addressed below: 
1. Maximise the use of DSS in SDNs: To 
economically merge DSS into SDNs, the optimal 
distribution and scaling of the DSS and energy 
storage system (ESS) were counted through a genetic 
algorithm, and the outcomes reflected that utilising 
DSS and ESSs economically promoted the energy-
not-supplied index of the SDNs (a Senior Manager). 
2. Effective voltage control through DSS: DSS 
have traditionally been managed by distribution 
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companies in a unity power factor control mode. But 
it disregards that some DSS also can provide reactive 
power support. With the increasing demand for 
reactive power support, new DSS were needed to 
provide this support (Deputy Director). 
3. Effective management of plug-in electric 
vehicles (PEVs): Transport electrification is seen as 
a realistic way to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
and oil dependency. 
4. Active demand management: Demand-side 
management enables customers to take an active 
position in setting-up smart city governance. With 
two-way information and communication 
technology, specifically enterprise resource planning 
(ERP), customers are urged to convert their 
consumption to off-peak times to minimise the 
required limit, thus maximising power security, 
reliability and efficiency. With increased demand, 
minimal peak usage and temporary use of DSS, the 
accounting solutions are increasingly attractive 
(Executive Director). 
 
5.2. Accounting interventions in setting-up smart 
city governance 
 
5.2.1. Enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
 
The ERP implementation plays a prominent 
accounting role in setting-up smart governance in 
New Cairo. Advanced ERP-based accounting 
technologies provide MEEDCO with timely data on 
connectivity between active devices in the city’s 
SDNs, including distributed supply sources, 
protection devices, and loads. The Financial Manager 
stated: 
“ERP, as an accounting solution, allows remote 
control of SDNs on an ever-increasing scale and is 
seen as a critical factor for success in smart 
governance in New Cairo.” 
ERP-based smart governance has introduced 
modern administrative and accounting technologies, 
which were not in the city’s old distribution 
networks. Modern technologies in the city have 
governmentalised SDNs to improve distribution 
quality, performance measurement, and thus cost 
minimisation. These have included modern 
technologies of an advanced metering/monitoring 
infrastructure (AMI), phasor measurement units 
(PMUs) and an energy storage system (ESS). Each 
application has a unique administrative and 
accounting function in the city’s SDNs. The Senior 
Accountant explained: 
“The AMI application connects smart meters, 
customers, energy resources, and various energy 
(cost) management systems together. It provides 
enough (cost) data to cover SDNs, it uses a powerful 
engine to store and analyse (cost) data and employs 
accurate links between customers, transformers, and 
sub-stations. Based on these functions, AMI can 
monitor and manage the costs and performance of 
transformers, cables, and circuits. By detecting 
power outages, AMI is also able to anticipate 
outstanding failures and related costs in the city’s 
SDNs.” 
The Senior Accountant continued by saying:  
“The PMUs application also supports smart 
governance processes in New Cairo electricity. PMUs 
measure phase error between SDNs and DSS and 
detect voltage loss and related costs. Its functions 
better protect the SDNs operating costs in the city.” 
The Deputy Director added: 
“The ESS application has also benefited the 
city’s smart governance by postponing network 
upgrade by shaving peak load, avoiding large-scale 
outages with demand responses. ESS mitigates the 
intermittency of some renewable energy resources 
and performs load and frequency regulations, 
increasing penetration levels of SDNs in the city. 
Using storage devices that have extremely fast 
dis/charge rates, ESS improves the reliability of 
SDNs and reduces related costs.” 
ERP has further governmentalised 
administrative and accounting practices and 
processes between the city government and the 
senior management in MEEDCO. Compared to the 
‘centralisation’ of power-knowledge relations in the 
city’s old sources of electricity distribution, 
management accounting has now received new 
functions of thinking and acting at the request of 
the city government: integrating and coordinating 
decentralised distribution (cost) centres embedded 
in SDNs. The Financial Manager stated:  
“ERP-based administrative and accounting 
technologies help MEEDCO to produce and send 
quarterly cost reports requested by senior 
management and city council in smart governance. 
Producing these (new) reports is to monitor the 
monthly cost movement of the city’s SDNs. These 
reports reflect the real performance of decentralised 
distribution (cost) centres, and thus, help senior 
management make appropriate decisions in 
responding to the city council’s needs. Monitoring 
this operational cost movement was not present in 
the city’s old sources of electricity distribution, 
where centralised power.” 
In pre-SDNs, monitoring the movement of 
operational costs was not present in the old sources 
of electricity distribution in the city, where the 
centralisation of power. Power was centralised only 
at that time by the city government. This, in turn, led 
to a lack of hierarchical and horizontal power 
relationships. Later, this gave rise to fields of 
ambiguity and lack of transparency, and thus the 
inability to employ effective government 
technologies such as accounting. A collaboration 
between various distribution (cost) centres did not 
result in the full alignment of power-knowledge 
relationships. This apparent lack of collaboration 
and visibility paves the way for the inclusion of 
accounting systems in New Cairo SDNs as a more 
centralised and systematically oriented approach, 
instead of a decentralised and dispersed approach 
(Argento et al., 2019). Therefore, when we 
interviewed seven operational managers how these 
ERP technologies affect daily smart governance 
practices, they immediately explained how they 
‘now’ interact with the ‘new computerised 
distribution system’ and the various ‘new’ reports it 
produces. Even those who suffered from the city’s 
old distribution management system often explained 
how they proudly see their managerial and 
accounting functions through advanced ERP 
technologies and how their current processes of 
smart governance are guided by SDNs in which the 
city government’s reporting protocols are 
governmentalised. 
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5.2.2. Cost movement reporting 
 
Cost movement reporting is one of the accounting 
contributions for setting-up smart governance in 
New Cairo city. In line with the smart governance 
initiative, as sixteen senior accountants and 
managers interviewed said, “cost movement is what 
we now have to explain to people in the city 
council”. Cost movement is the variance between 
recorded costs, prior period figures and budgeted 
figures. In classical governance, this is just 
an accounting system for reporting variances. But, in 
smart governance and accountability, according to 
those who have historically lived such a system in 
MEEDCO, it signifies a ‘new’ cost-management 
practice provided by the city government’s smart 
distribution reforms. 
Thus, cost movement became a ‘smart 
calculative logic’ through which government 
technologies of management and accounting are 
now represented at MEEDCO. The Head of the Cost 
Accounting Department mentioned in this regard: 
“Each decentralised distribution (cost) centre is 
responsible for controlling the daily movement of 
SDNs operating costs in New Cairo city. Daily 
variances between budget and actual are newly 
reported to the Head of Cost Accounting 
Department. The head of the department prepares 
a formal report afterwards, called the Daily 
Operating Report, registering the reasons for these 
variances and explaining increases in distribution 
costs, if any. For smart governance, the SDNs cost 
movement became the modern calculative logic of 
the city council through which MEEDCO’s 
distribution efficiency is understood and 
communicated.” 
This SDNs cost movement report extends 
beyond the company to include various government 
agencies in smart city governance. A Senior 
Accountant explained that MEEDCO must submit 
aggregate quarterly cost movement reports to the 
EEHC, the Central Agency for Accountability, and the 
City Council Board by the tenth day of the month 
following each quarter. This, as reflected by a Junior 
Accountant, is to ensure that MEEDCO keeps SDNs 
operational costs under control and to ensure that 
the company is not a “financial burden” on the city 
council or other various government agencies. The 
idea of “financial burden” on the city government 
has been firmly registered in the minds of MEEDCO 
managers. Now, periodic financial statements are 
not the most important factors for smart city 
governance, but detailed SDNs cost movement 
reports. 
 
5.2.3. Pricing study 
 
The production of pricing study is another 
accounting contribution to establishing smart city 
governance in New Cairo electricity. Detailed 
accounting reports, specifically SDNs cost movement 
reports, have an influential political power in 
governmentalising smart electricity prices for 
citizens. Regular accessibility and affordability of 
smart electricity distributions to citizens as 
end-users are politically sensible issues. The city 
government, therefore, uses detailed SDNs cost 
movement reports as a political instrument to 
govern smart electricity tariffs. The Financial 
Manager explained: 
“The price tariffs that we offer citizens as 
end-users are issues of political importance. 
Therefore, the city council uses detailed accounting 
reports as a political tool to control smart electricity 
prices. MEEDCO has no authority to produce its own 
tariffs as it deems appropriate. Instead, MEEDCO can 
only produce a pricing study, justified by quarterly 
cost reports that reveal various operational 
movements regarding costs, distributions, outages, 
employees, etc…” 
This pricing study is an intermediary 
accounting device in negotiations between MEEDCO 
and the city government on the tariff structure of 
smart electricity distributions. The Financial 
Manager continued: 
“With smart governance, MEEDCO must submit 
a pricing study to the city council having prepared 
its annual budget. The council has some specific 
criteria for granting us approval for proposed 
supply costs and selling prices. Costs and prices 
must be proposed within the policies and structures 
set by the Council Board. If the review team of the 
Board members finds that our pricing study does 
not comply with these specific policies and 
structures, it will reject the proposal…” 
The Financial Manager concluded our 
discussion on a pricing study by saying: 
“…So producing a pricing study, based on 
detailed SDNs cost movement reports, is now our 
biggest assignment to establish smart city 
governance in New Cairo electricity. It is perhaps the 
most important thing we discuss in our 
accountability meetings with the various 




This paper extends prior accounting studies in two 
ways. Firstly, it demonstrates how the political role 
of management accounting gradually developed in 
line with the changing ideologies of smart city 
governance (Argento et al., 2019). By focusing on 
policy changes that have caused effective 
governance impacts, our smart city analysis provides 
an in-depth understanding of governance and 
governmentality, and thus changes in the political 
role of management accounting. During the 
neoliberal governmentality regime, the political role 
of management accounting information served, on 
the one hand, as an instrument used by the city 
government to stifle privatisation, and on the other 
hand as a technology for reform. Hence, this 
portrayed its paradoxicality (Grossi et al., 2020). The 
fraudulent nature of the politicised accounting 
system was exposed by the privatisation programme 
led by the World Bank. One of the outcomes of the 
exposure of shortcomings of the system is that it 
discouraged private investors, resulting in the 
failure to achieve a transfer of ownership from the 
public to private. That notwithstanding, the smart 
calculative logic of managing for profit within 
a state-owned enterprise, governed by the city’s 
neoliberal managerial reforms, was forged ahead by 
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the World Bank (Brorström et al., 2018; Jayasinghe & 
Uddin, 2019). 
The governmentalisation of the neoliberal 
method of managing enterprises with 
state-ownership enforced the culture whereby 
components of the smart logic of capital 
accumulation (i.e., costs, revenue and profits) 
became the critical components of performance 
monitoring and control for the city (Argento et al., 
2019; Klauser et al., 2014). Accounting information 
played a significant role in effecting the neoliberal 
managerial change in the smart governance project 
of New Cairo city (Mizrahi & Minchuk, 2019; 
Engelbert, 2019; Bunders & Varró, 2019). An 
ERP-based private mode of accounting information, 
reintegrated into the cost management protocols of 
the city government, ensured that the regulatory 
apparatuses and fiscal reporting of New Cairo city 
stayed connected to this private mode of accounting. 
This ruling change in the city government resulted 
in managers recognising cost movement 
responsibility as a significant managerial challenge 
to solve. Therefore, these changes have resulted in 
cost management becoming a critical aspect of both 
operational and strategic management (Mizrahi & 
Minchuk, 2019). 
Secondly, by ruling the profit-driven 
management accounting information within the 
regulatory mechanism and state-owned enterprises, 
the type of smartness developing in certain marginal 
countries is exhibited (Cowley et al., 2018; Meijer & 
Bolívar, 2016). This is very similar to the common 
evaluation of ‘neoliberalism’ as a political doctrine 
that governs the ideology of free market and right to 
private property as the foundation of city 
development (Grossi et al., 2020; Chiapello, 2017; 
Hopper, 2017; Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008). 
That notwithstanding, the idea of an emergent 
market and its resultant accountability system 
should be carefully dealt with. This is because there 
is no actual free and competitive market in this 
Egyptian context; rather only the free market 
ideology actualised by governing the practices of 
calculating costs and profits, and reporting (Bigoni & 
Funnell, 2015). For the subsidiaries of a state-owned 
holding enterprise, the planning and structuring of 
competition are through specific governance 
arrangements. Such governance arrangements were 
incorporated into the market structure of the 
regulated environment by granting each subsidiary 
(including MEEDCO) a near-monopolistic control in 
different geographical regions. In this quasi 
monopolism, market-determined prices are 
non-existent, but rather prices are based on 
a regulated pricing structure. The effect of this is 
a competitive environment that is based on 
institutions validated through a specific accounting 
mode, rather than based on market forces (Hopper, 
2017; Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Samuel, 2003). 
The financial performance and financial 
position of the EEHC are not significantly disclosed 
in its published annual reports. Rather, comparative 
statistics on the costs of electricity production and 
distribution in the different geographic regions 
within the control of each subsidiary are disclosed in 
the reports. The income statement, statement of 
financial position, and statement of cash flows are 
not presented in the EEHC’s annual reports. In the 
five years to 2014/15, the word profit is indicated 
only on two occasions in EEHC’s annual reports. 
Firstly, profit is mentioned as an element of 
corporate vision, in its annual report of 2008/09 
(EEHC, n.d.a., p. 7) as follows: “EEHC’s main role is to 
coordinate, supervise, monitor and follow-up its 
affiliated companies’ activities in the fields of 
generation, transmission and distribution of electric 
energy in order to improve and develop the 
technical, operational and financial performance of 
the companies to achieve the main goal of 
optimising the use of all resources and maximising 
the profit”. Secondly, following the implementation 
of smart cities projects and subsequent sustainable 
development goals (e.g., SDNs) in Egypt, a net profit 
of 2,020 million Egyptian pounds was reported in 
the table of “Financial Situation of EEHC and its 
Affiliated Companies”, in the 2014/15 annual 
reports (EEHC, n.d.b., p. 11). Because these statistics 
render the comparability of subsidiaries firms 
possible, thus giving a sense of competitiveness 
between the subsidiaries, the annual reports could 
be likened to league tables of operational 
performance of subsidiaries. This apparent 
competition serves as a motivational force for each 
subsidiary company’s management to aim to achieve 
an efficient cost per kilowatt hour of distribution, in 
order to be better positioned in the comparative 
statistics. This is because the most important 
statistics by which corporate managers are assessed 
against their peers is the cost per kilowatt hour of 
distribution (Argento et al., 2019; Mizrahi & 
Minchuk, 2019; Brorström et al., 2018). 
The multi-agency accountability through 
multiple regulatory organs (mainly EEHC, MOEE, and 
the city government) forms the basis for MEEDCO’s 
competitive industrial structure (Broccardo et al., 
2019). This is consistent with the view that for 
micro-organisational practices to be transformed in 
neoliberalism, continuous government intervention 
is required (Engelbert, 2019; Klauser et al., 2014; 
McKinlay & Pezet, 2018). The political intervention 
was reinvented by providing a sense of competition 
among governmental actors through the 
transformation of New Cairo city government into 
interconnected regulatory organs. Miller (2010) 
argues that the desire for intervention to uphold the 
non-interventionism is a great contradiction of 
neoliberalism and governmentality. This is because 
neoliberalism and governmentality consider that 
without substantial policing by regulatory organs 
(e.g., the apparent non-governmental role of the city 
government), tenets of market competition as the 
natural foundation of efficiency and effectiveness 
would not be possible (Hollands, 2015). Therefore, in 
New Cairo smart city neoliberal politics, with politics 
featuring as non-politics, participants often assert 
that they are no longer subjected to political 
manipulation (Engelbert, 2019; Kitchin et al., 2017; 
Klauser et al., 2014). 
There is a seeming ‘smartness’ in neoliberal 
structural reforms, however, they are highly 
imposing and controlling. A governmental 
environment that presents an incorrect impression 
of deliberative governance with less political 
intervention is a characteristic of smart city projects 
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(Argento et al., 2019; Brorström et al., 2018). 
However, neoliberal smart governance is presently 
comprised of the subtle link between the city 
government and global development funding organs 
(World Bank) which are the regulatory organs 
(Engelbert, 2019; Broccardo et al., 2019; Meijer & 
Bolívar, 2016). Even this environment makes ‘no 
difference’ since there is ‘no room’ for social actors 
(e.g., managers, trade unions and professionals) to 
enact their interventions by repetitive 
governmentalisation and non-governmentalisation 
(Hollands, 2015). As is evident in the New Cairo 
smart electricity project (e.g., SDNs), the only 
‘visible’ change in this complex context is the 
neoliberal ‘policies’ of governance and 
governmentality; however, neoliberal ‘politics’ could 
not be altered even due to massive political events 




The purpose of this study is to explore the ways in 
which the smart cities agenda has forced the 
electricity company to reorient its accounting tools. 
The study was based on the concept of 
governmentality (Foucault, 2008) for the question: 
how smart electricity costs and pricing policies 
imposed by political decision-makers govern a smart 
city performance. Empirical data came from field 
research conducted in 2018 at MEEDCO, 
i.e., a state-owned energy company in New Cairo city. 
The findings show that MEEDCO has smartly 
operated in New Cairo city by executing SDNs and 
subsequent technologies of government 
management and accounting that enable profitably 
monitored operations and costs on a daily basis. At 
macro-micro organisational levels, however, 
MEEDCO does not operate in free-market settings. 
Political decision-makers at regional/local 
government levels (for example, EEHC and City 
Council) arbitrarily set smart electricity distribution 
price tariffs. MEEDCO was forced to apply structured 
price tariffs in daily operations to ensure its 
socio-political legitimacy and power in the city. In 
this politicised pricing governance, MEEDCO’s senior 
managers monitor the operating movements of 
smart distribution costs through detailed quarterly 
“cost reports”. 
A critical issue, here, is that an exclusive focus 
on distribution costs cannot provide politicians with 
a full (right) picture of the cost movement of 
MEEDCO’s smart networks. Operating cost 
movement reports might be ‘misleading’ and cannot 
be assumed to ensure proper governance and 
accountability of public funds used to finance such 
a complex smart electricity project. Our contribution 
is to show new evidence on the socio-political 
impetus of smart city projects, which were formed 
in governmentality and politics, and the subsequent 
smartness of management accounting technologies 
at extra- and intra- organisational levels. As in other 
case studies research, our findings cannot be 
generalised to smart cities and companies other 
than New Cairo and MEEDCO studied. Therefore, as 
a future research trend given the existing lack and 
hitherto unexplored linkages, comparative and 
multidisciplinary studies can be conducted in order 
to analyse specific contextual differences and 
implications for the interaction between the multiple 
functions of management accounting mechanisms in 
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